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Institute of Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
The focus of studies on second-order false belief reasoning generally was on
investigating the roles of executive functions and language with correlational studies.
Different from those studies, we focus on the question how 5-year-olds select and
revise reasoning strategies in second-order false belief tasks by constructing two
computational cognitive models of this process: an instance-based learning model and
a reinforcement learning model. Unlike the reinforcement learning model, the instance-
based learning model predicted that children who fail second-order false belief tasks
would give answers based on first-order theory of mind (ToM) reasoning as opposed
to zero-order reasoning. This prediction was confirmed with an empirical study that
we conducted with 72 5- to 6-year-old children. The results showed that 17% of the
answers were correct and 83% of the answers were wrong. In line with our prediction,
65% of the wrong answers were based on a first-order ToM strategy, while only 29%
of them were based on a zero-order strategy (the remaining 6% of subjects did not
provide any answer). Based on our instance-based learning model, we propose that
when children get feedback “Wrong,” they explicitly revise their strategy to a higher level
instead of implicitly selecting one of the available ToM strategies. Moreover, we predict
that children’s failures are due to lack of experience and that with exposure to second-
order false belief reasoning, children can revise their wrong first-order reasoning strategy
to a correct second-order reasoning strategy.
Keywords: second-order false belief reasoning, theory of mind, instance-based learning, reinforcement learning,
computational cognitive modeling, ACT-R
INTRODUCTION
The ability to understand that other people have mental states, such as desires, beliefs, knowledge
and intentions, which can be different from one’s own, is called theory of mind (ToM; Premack and
Woodruff, 1978). Many studies have shown that children who are younger than four have problems
to pass verbal tasks in which they are expected to predict or explain another agent’s behavior
in terms of the agent’s mental states, such as false beliefs (Wellman et al., 2001; see Onishi and
Baillargeon, 2005 for an example of a non-verbal false belief task). In our daily lives, we do not only
take the perspective of another agent (first-order ToM) but also use this ToM recursively by taking
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the perspective of an agent who is taking the perspective of
another agent. For example, if David says, “Mary (falsely) believes
that John knows that the chocolate is in the drawer,” he is applying
second-order ToM by attributing a mental state to Mary who is
attributing another mental state to John. While children start to
pass verbal first-order ToM tasks around the age of four, it takes
them a further one to 3 years to pass second-order ToM tasks
(Perner and Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan et al., 1994; for a review,
see Miller, 2009, 2012). Why can children not pass second-order
ToM tasks once they are able to pass first-order ToM tasks? The
central focus of this study is to provide a procedural account
by constructing computational cognitive models1 to answer this
question.
Many studies have shown that children who are younger than
four are make systematic errors in verbal first-order false belief
tasks (Wellman et al., 2001). A prototype of verbal first-order false
belief task is as follows: “Ayla and Murat are sister and brother.
They are playing in their room. Their mother comes and gives
chocolate to Murat but not to Ayla, because she has been naughty.
Murat eats some of his chocolate and puts the remainder into
the drawer. He doesn’t give any chocolate to Ayla. She is upset
that she doesn’t get any chocolate. After that, Murat leaves the
room to help his mother. Ayla is alone in the room. Because she
is upset, she decides to change the location of the chocolate. She
takes the chocolate from the drawer, and puts it into the toy box.
Subsequently, Murat comes to the room and says he wants to eat
his chocolate.” At this point, the experimenter asks a first-order
false belief question: “Where will Murat look for his chocolate?”
Children who are able to give the correct answer by saying “in the
drawer,” correctly attribute a false belief to Murat, because he does
not know that Ayla put the chocolate into the toy box. If children
do not know the answer to the first-order false belief question
and simply try to guess the answer, they can randomly report
one of the two locations: “drawer” or “toy box.” Interestingly,
most 3-year-old children do not give random answers but make
systematic errors by reporting the real location of the chocolate
(zero-order ToM) instead of reporting the other character’s false
belief (first-order ToM). This systematic error is generally called
‘reality bias’2 (Mitchell et al., 1996).
There are two dominant explanations in the first-order ToM
literature for 3-year-olds’ ‘reality bias.’ The first explanation
proposes that children do not distinguish the concept of beliefs
from reality, thus children need a conceptual change (Wellman
and Gopnik, 1994; Wellman et al., 2001). The second explanation
proposes that children’s systematic error is due to the fact that
reality is more salient to them, thus children’s failure in verbal
tasks are in general due to the complexity of the tasks, which adds
further processing demands on children’s reasoning processes
(Carlson and Moses, 2001; Hughes, 2002; Birch and Bloom, 2004,
2007; Epley et al., 2004). More specifically, children automatically
1We will use the general term ‘model’ to refer to the term ‘computational cognitive
model’ for the rest of this study.
2It is also called ‘egocentrism’ (Piaget, 1930) or the ‘curse of knowledge’ (Birch
and Bloom, 2004). Although these different terms correspond to some underlying
theoretical differences (see Mitchell et al., 1996 and Birch and Bloom, 2004 for
these differences), we use the term ‘reality bias’ in this study to refer to children’s
systematic errors based on reality.
reason about their own perspective and in order to give an
answer about another agent’s perspective which is different from
the reality, they should first inhibit their own perspective and
then take into account the other agent’s perspective and give
an answer accordingly (Leslie and Polizzi, 1998; Leslie et al.,
2004, 2005). The debate is still on about the possible reasons of
children’s ‘reality bias’ (Hansen, 2010; Lewis et al., 2012; Helming
et al., 2014; Baillargeon et al., 2015; Rubio-Fernández, 2017).
In any case, it is known that most of the typically developing
children around the age of 5 are able to pass first-order false
belief tasks. Therefore, we can safely assume that 5-year-old
children’s conceptual development of reasoning about another
agent’s false beliefs and their executive functioning abilities to
inhibit their own perspective are already well developed. This
means that 5-year-olds have both efficient zero-order and first-
order ToM strategies in their repertoire. Furthermore, we argue
that although 5-year-olds are able to attribute second-order
mental states to other agents, they are not used to answering
questions that require second-order false belief attribution, which
is why they need sufficient exposure to second-order false belief
stories to revise their strategy.
Similar to the first-order false belief tasks, second-order false
belief tasks are used to assess the continuation of children’s ToM
development after the age of 4. Regardless of the variations in
the second-order false belief tasks (see Perner and Wimmer,
1985; Sullivan et al., 1994), they provide two critical pieces of
information in addition to the first-order false belief task for
which we introduced a prototype above. The first addition for
the prototype story is: “While Ayla is changing the location of
the chocolate, Murat passes by the window, and he sees how Ayla
takes the chocolate from the drawer and puts it into the toy box.”
The second additional aspect is: “Ayla does not notice that Murat
sees her hiding the chocolate” (Figure 1D). Therefore, Ayla has a
false belief about Murat’s belief about the location of the chocolate
(i.e., Ayla thinks that Murat believes that the chocolate is in the
drawer). The second-order false belief question for this prototype
is as follows: “Where does Ayla think that Murat will look for the
chocolate?”3. If children correctly attribute a false belief to Ayla,
who thinks that Murat believes that the chocolate is in the drawer,
they give the correct answer “drawer.” Otherwise, they give the
wrong answer “toy box.” However, the answer “toy box” would be
the correct answer to both the question “Where is the chocolate
now?” (zero-order ToM), and the question “Where will Murat
look for the chocolate?” (first-order ToM). That is why it is not
possible to distinguish whether the wrong answer “toy box” to the
second-order false belief question is due to applying a zero-order
or a first-order ToM strategy.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that has a
specific prediction together with a possible explanation about
the level of ToM reasoning in children’s wrong answers in
second-order false belief tasks. However, a modified version
of the standard second-order false belief task in which it is
possible to distinguish children’s level of ToM reasoning has been
constructed (Hollebrandse et al., 2008). Following our prototype
3For another type of second-order false belief question see the ‘Three goals’ story
prototype in Section “Materials.”
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FIGURE 1 | A modified version of the standard ‘unexpected location’ second-order false belief stories (Illustration© Avik Kumar Maitra) (A) The first
image in the first row, (B) The second image in the first row, (C) The third image in the first row, (D) The first image in the second row, (E) The second image in the
second row, (F) The third image in the second row.
of the standard second-order false belief story that we mentioned
above, a prototype of the modified version of the second-order
false belief story has the following additional information: After
telling the children that Ayla does not know that Murat saw her
hiding the chocolate in the toy box, the children are informed
that the mother of Ayla and Murat comes to the room when both
Ayla and Murat are not there. The mother finds the chocolate in
the toy box while she is cleaning the room, takes it out of the toy
box, and puts it into the TV stand (Figure 1E). This modification
allows us to distinguish children’s zero-order ToM answers (“TV
stand”) from their first-order ToM answers (“toy box”) for the
second-order false belief question “Where does Ayla think that
Murat will look for the chocolate?”.
Considering our central question why children cannot pass
second-order false belief tasks once they are able to pass
first-order false belief tasks, a new question about strategy
selection arises: Once 5-year-old children already have zero-
order and first-order ToM strategies in their repertoire, do they
predominantly use a zero-order ToM strategy or a first-order
ToM strategy when they fail in second-order false belief tasks?
There are two contradictory findings about children’s systematic
errors on second-order false belief tasks. Hollebrandse et al.
(2008) tested 35 American-English 7-year-old children (range:
6.1 – 7.10, mean = 6.11) with a modified version of a second-
order false belief task. The goal of their study was to investigate
the acquisition of recursive embedding and its possible relation
with recursive ToM. Their results about the second-order false
belief task showed that while 58% of the answers were based on
second-order ToM strategy, 32% of the answers were based on a
first-order ToM strategy, and none of the answers was based on
a zero-order ToM strategy. In contrast, de Villiers et al.’s (2014)
preliminary results showed that 60% of 5- to 6-year-olds’ answers
were based on the zero-order ToM strategy, and only around
20% of children’s answers were based on the first-order ToM
strategy in the second-order false belief task. Different from those
studies, our empirical study was designed to investigate children’s
level of wrong answers, and we had a model-based prediction
about children’s systematic errors in second-order false belief
tasks before conducting the empirical study.
Another important question is: What do children need
for revising their wrong strategy to a correct second-order
ToM strategy? Analogous to the first-order ToM literature,
two possible explanations have been proposed for children’s
development of second-order ToM: (i) conceptual change, and
(ii) complexity (Miller, 2009, p. 751; Miller, 2012). The pure
conceptual change explanation suggests that children’s failure in
the second-order ToM tasks is due to their lack of realization that
mental states such as beliefs can be used recursively (e.g., “John
thinks that David believes that. . .”). On the other hand, the pure
complexity explanation suggests that it is the higher complexity
of second-order ToM reasoning that adds further demands on
working memory, as does the linguistic complexity of the stories
and the questions, in comparison to first-order ToM tasks.
In order to provide a procedural account for children’s ToM
strategy revision, we constructed two computational cognitive
models by implementing two possible learning mechanisms. The
first is based on reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998;
Van Rijn et al., 2003; Shah, 2012). This type of learning is based
on the utilities of the rules that carry out the possible strategies.
Based on feedback, a reward/punishment is propagated back in
time through the rules that have been used to make the decision.
This reward/punishment mechanism updates the utility of those
rules and finally the model learns to apply a correct strategy.
The second model is based on instanced-based learning
(Logan, 1988; Gonzalez and Lebiere, 2005; Stevens et al., 2016).
The central idea in instance-based learning is that decisions are
based on past experiences that are stored in memory. Whenever
a decision has to be made, the most active experience is retrieved
from memory and used as the basis for the decision. Activation
is based on history (how frequent and recent was the experience)
and on similarity (how similar is the context of the past decision
to the present experience). An advantage of instance-based
learning is that feedback can be used to create an instance that
incorporates the correct solution.
We used instance-based learning for the selection of different
levels of ToM strategies (i.e., zero-order, first-order, second-
order) that are stored in the declarative memory. When the model
is correct in using a particular level of ToM, it will strengthen
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the instance related to that level, but when the model makes a
mistake, it will add an instance for the next level.
Instead of adopting either the pure conceptual change or
the pure complexity explanation, we argue that the following
steps are followed. First, children should be aware that they
can use their first-order ToM strategy recursively. Importantly,
different from the reinforcement learning model, the instance-
based learning model explicitly revises its strategy, therefore,
it satisfies this condition. After that, children have to have
efficient cognitive skills to carry out second-order ToM reasoning
without mistakes. In the scope of this study, we assume that
5-year-olds have efficient cognitive skills to carry out the second-
order ToM strategy. Finally, children need enough experience
to determine that the second-order ToM strategy is the correct
strategy to pass second-order false belief tasks (see Goodman
et al., 2006 for a model of children’s development of first-order
false belief reasoning based on experience; and Gopnik and
Wellman, 1992 for the theory that children are rational agents
and that with additional evidence they revise their theories, just
like scientists do).
Both the reinforcement learning model and the instance-based
learning model strengthen or revise their strategies based on
experience and the feedback “Correct/Wrong” without further
explanation. Is it possible to assume that children get feedback
“Correct/Wrong” in ToM-related tasks in their everyday life?
There can be many social situations in which children get
the feedback “Correct/Wrong,” not from a person who gives
feedback verbally, but from other consequences of a particular
ToM strategy. For example, young children who are not able
to apply a first-order ToM strategy are generally unable to hide
themselves properly when they are playing hide and seek4 (e.g.,
they hide themselves behind the curtain while their feet are
visible or basically they close their eyes with their hands without
hiding themselves). In this case, the feedback “Wrong” would be
conferred by the fact that the seeker finds the hider immediately.
Similarly, at a later stage of development, imagine a child secretly
eating some of the chocolates that his mother explicitly told him
not to eat. As soon as his mother comes back to the room, the
child says that he does not like chocolate with nuts. His mother
gets angry and tells him to go to his room and not to join them
for dinner. In this case, the child was unable to use a second-
order ToM strategy (i.e., my mother should not know that I
know that there are chocolates with nuts) and although he does
not get any explanations, he does get the feedback “Wrong.”
Note that in this example, the child also requires other types of
reasoning, such as causal reasoning, in addition to second-order
ToM.
The main differences between the reinforcement learning
model and the instance-based learning model derive from the
way they handle the feedback when the given answer is wrong.
While the reinforcement learning model punishes the strategies
that lead to a wrong answer, the instance-based learning model
adds an instance of another strategy. This is because while
the strategy selection is implicit in the reinforcement learning
4See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u03VidFILmg for a video of young
children’s failure in hide and seek.
model, it is explicit in the instance-based learning model.
Moreover, if feedback with further explanations is provided, the
instance-based learning model will more likely use a second-
order ToM strategy, because it explicitly increments the level
of ToM strategy to a higher ToM strategy. On the other hand,
the reinforcement learning model can do nothing with the
further explanations. We provide more detailed explanations
for these two learning mechanisms in our models in Section
“The Relevant Mechanisms of the Cognitive Architecture ACT-
R.” Importantly, these two models provide different predictions
about children’s wrong answers in second-order false belief
tasks. We present those predictions in Section “Comparing the
Predictions of the Two Models” and test them in an empirical
study in Section “Experimental Validation of the Instance-Based
Learning Model.”
In the following section, we first review the previous
computational models of verbal first-order and second-order
false belief reasoning. After that, we discuss the relevant
mechanisms of the cognitive architecture ACT-R. Subsequently,
we explain our instance-based and reinforcement learning
models and their results and predictions.
A MODEL OF SECOND-ORDER FALSE
BELIEF REASONING
Along with studying children’s development empirically, the
modeling approach is a powerful method to provide insight into
the underlying processes of children’s performance (see Taatgen
and Anderson, 2002 for an example on how children learn
irregular English verbs without feedback; Van Rij et al., 2010
for an example of the underlying processes of children’s poor
performance on pronoun interpretation). In particular, using
cognitive architectures (e.g., ACT-R: Anderson, 2007; SOAR:
Laird, 2012; SIGMA: Rosenbloom, 2013; PRIMs: Taatgen, 2013)
gives us the opportunity to make specific predictions about
children’s accuracy, reaction times, and even the brain regions
that are activated when they perform a task. These predictions
can then be tested empirically.
In general, cognitive architectures have certain general
assumptions about human cognition and have some parameters
that are set to a default value based on previous psychological
experiments to simulate average human performance. For
example, it takes 200 ms to press a button on the keyboard once
a decision has been made and the finger is ready to press it.
In addition to these general assumptions, modelers make their
own specific assumptions about the tasks that they are modeling
and those assumptions can be tested empirically together with
the model’s simulation results. Because it is always possible to
make a fit to data by changing the parameters, it is preferable
not to change these default values of the architecture and not to
introduce new parameters unless there is a good explanation for
doing so.
In this study, we use the cognitive architecture ACT-R
(Anderson and Lebiere, 1998; Anderson, 2007). Before providing
information about ACT-R and our models, in the following
subsection, we review the previous computational cognitive
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models of verbal first-order and second-order false belief
reasoning.
PREVIOUS MODELS OF FALSE BELIEF
REASONING
Only few computational cognitive models of verbal false belief
reasoning have been constructed in the literature, aiming to
contribute to theoretical discussions by providing explanations.
Most of those models aimed to explain children’s development of
first-order false belief reasoning.
Goodman et al. (2006) approach the development of first-
order false belief reasoning as rational use and revision of
intuitive theories, instead of focusing on children’s limitations in
processing information. By using Bayesian analysis, they simulate
the transition from a model that represents children’s reasoning
from their own perspective (zero-order ToM) to another model
that takes into account another agent’s perspectives (first-order
ToM). Initially, the zero-order ToM model is preferred due
to the Bayesian Occam’s razor effect. Subsequently, based on
experience with first-order false belief reasoning, the first-
order ToM model becomes the preferred model thanks to
its explanatory power. Bello and Cassimatis’ (2006) rule-based
model showed that explicit reasoning about beliefs of another
agent might not be necessary in order to pass first-order
false belief tasks and that it is enough to relate people to
alternate states of affairs and to objects in the world. Hiatt and
Trafton (2010) simulated the gradual developmental of first-
order ToM by using reinforcement learning. Their models have
a good match to the available gradual development data in the
literature. However, they introduced additional parameters to
the core cognitive architecture, namely a “selection parameter”
representing increasing functionality of the brain in children’s
development, and a “simulation parameter” that determines
the availability of rules for simulation in predicting another
person’s action (i.e., if the simulation parameter is 0, the
model is not able to predict another’s action). Therefore, the
transition from zero-order ToM reasoning to first-order ToM
reasoning is achieved by manipulating those parameters. More
recently, Arslan et al.’s (2015b) model predicted that training
children with working memory tasks might also contribute to
the transition from failure to success in first-order false belief
tasks.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two
computational cognitive modeling studies of second-order
false belief reasoning. Wahl and Spada (2000) modeled a
competent child’s reasoning steps in a second-order false
belief task by using a logic programming language. Their
simulations predicted that explanation of a second-order false
belief attribution is more complex than its prediction. They
validated their model-based prediction with an empirical study
with children between the ages 6–10. For future research, they
suggested to use a cognitive architecture such as ACT-R to
simulate children’s incorrect answers. Recently, similar to their
first-order false belief reasoning model, Hiatt and Trafton (2015)
simulated the gradual developmental of second-order ToM by
using reinforcement learning. Again, their model had a good
match to the available data for the developmental trajectory of
second-order ToM. However, they kept the “selection parameter”
and “simulation parameter” that they introduced to the default
parameters of ACT-R and they did not provide any specific
predictions that can be tested empirically.
Different from the available second-order ToM models, we set
the following criteria when constructing our models:
(i) The models should simulate children’s transitions from
incorrect to correct answers in second-order false belief
tasks;
(ii) The transition to second-order reasoning should naturally
emerge from the simulation, and should not be controlled
by mechanisms that are not part of the cognitive
architecture (i.e., ACT-R);
(iii) The models should provide predictions that can be tested
empirically, before conducting a behavioral experiment.
Considering the above-mentioned criteria, we explore two
different learning mechanisms of ACT-R, namely instance-based
learning and reinforcement learning, to be able to compare their
predictions.
The Relevant Mechanisms of the
Cognitive Architecture ACT-R
ACT-R is a hybrid symbolic/sub-symbolic production-based
cognitive architecture (see Anderson, 2007 for a detailed
overview). Knowledge is represented in two different memory
systems in ACT-R.
While the declarative memory represents the factual
knowledge in the form of chunks (i.e., “The capital of France
is Paris”), procedural knowledge (i.e., how to ride a bicycle) is
represented by the production rules in the form of IF-THEN
rules. The procedural knowledge and the factual knowledge
interact when production rules retrieve a chunk from the
declarative memory. At any time, the central pattern matcher
checks the IF part of the production rules that match the current
goal of the model, and if multiple production rules match the
current goal, the rule that has the highest utility value is executed.
The utility value is calculated from estimates of the cost and
probability of reaching the goal if that production rule is chosen.
Noise is also added to the expected utility of a production rule,
making production rule selection stochastic. When a production
rule is successfully executed, the central pattern matcher checks
again for production rules that match the current goal. Thus,
cognition unfolds as a succession of production rule executions.
For models of learning in decision making, there are two
categories of solutions in ACT-R: (i) instance-based learning,
(ii) reinforcement learning. Instance-based learning occurs by
adding new chunks to the declarative memory. If an identical
chunk is already in memory, the new chunk is merged with
the previous identical chunk and their activation values are
combined. Each chunk is associated with an activation value
that represents the usefulness of that chunk. The activation
value of a chunk depends on its base-level activation (B) and
on activation sources originating in the model’s context. The
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base-level activation is determined by the frequency and recency
of a chunk’s use together with a noise value (Anderson and
Schooler, 2000). A chunk will be retrieved if its activation
value is higher than a retrieval threshold, which is assigned
by the modeler. While a chunk’s activation value increases
each time it is retrieved, its activation value will decay over
time when it is not retrieved. Depending on the type of the
request from declarative memory, the chunk with the highest
activation value is retrieved. The optimized learning equation
which is used in the instance-based learning model to calculate
the learning of base-level activation for a chunk i is as follows:
Bi = ln (n/(1 − d)) − d∗ ln (L)
Here, n is the number of presentations of chunk i, L is the
lifetime of chunk i (the time since its creation), and d is the decay
parameter.
In ACT-R, reinforcement learning occurs when the utilities
(U) that are attached to production rules are updated based
on experience (Taatgen et al., 2006). A strategy (i.e., zero-order,
first-order, second-order) that has the highest probability of
success is used more often. Utilities can be updated based on
reward (R). Reward can be associated with specific strategies,
which are implemented by production rules. The reward is
propagated back to all the previous production rules that are
between the current reward and the previous reward. The
reward that is propagated back is calculated with the assigned
reward value minus the time passed since the execution of the
related production rule, meaning that more distant production
rules receive less reward. If the assigned reward is zero, the
production rules related to the execution of a production rule
that is associated with the reward will receive negative reward
(punishment). Based on these mechanisms, a model learns to
apply the best strategy for a given task. The utility learning
equation which is used in the reinforcement learning model is
as follows:
Ui (n) = Ui (n − 1) + α [Ri (n) − Ui (n − 1)]
Here, Ui (n-1) is the utility of a production i after its n-1st
application, Ri (n) is the reward the production receives for its
nth application and α is the learning rate.
In the following two sections, we explain the details of how the
instance-based learning and reinforcement learning model select
ToM strategies based on experience. Subsequently, we explain the
general assumptions and the reasoning steps in both models.
How the Instance-Based Learning Model
Goes Through Transitions
The assumption of the instance-based learning model is that
possible strategies to apply different levels of ToM reasoning
in the second-order false belief task (i.e., zero-order, first-order,
second-order) are represented as chunks in declarative memory.
The model uses these to select its strategy at the start of a problem:
It will retrieve the strategy with the highest activation, after which
production rules carry out that strategy. Based on the success, the
model will either strengthen a successful strategy chunk, or will
add or strengthen an alternative strategy if the current one failed.
Our instance-based learning model uses the same mechanism for
strategy selection as in Meijering et al.’s (2014) ACT-R model that
shows adults’ strategy selection in a ToM game. The core idea of
their model was that people in general use ToM strategies that are
“as simple as possible, as complex as necessary” so as to deal with
the high cognitive demands of a task.
The instance-based learning model starts with only a single
strategy, which is stored in declarative memory as a chunk:
the zero-order ToM strategy. Similar to young children’s daily
life experiences, the zero-order ToM strategy chunk’s base level
activation is set to a high value to represent that the model has a
lot of experience in using this strategy. In line with this simplistic
zero-order ToM strategy that is based on the real location of the
object, the model gives the answer “TV stand” (see Figure 1) to
the second-order false belief question (“Where does Ayla think
that Murat will look for the chocolate?”). However, as this is
not the correct answer to the second-order false belief question
(drawer), the model gets the feedback “Wrong” without any
further explanation. This stage of the model in which the zero-
order ToM strategy seems to be more salient than the first-order
ToM strategy represents children who are able to attribute first-
order false beliefs but are lacking experience in applying the
first-order ToM strategy.
Given this feedback, the model increments the reasoning
strategy just used (zero-order) one level up and enters a new
strategy chunk in declarative memory: a chunk that represents
the first-order ToM strategy, in which the former (zero-order)
strategy is now attributed to Murat. This makes it a first-order
ToM strategy because this time the model gives an answer based
on what the reality is (zero-order) from Murat’s perspective
(first-order). Because the model has more experience with the
zero-order ToM strategy, the activation of the zero-order ToM
strategy chunk at first is higher than the recently added first-
order ToM strategy chunk. This causes the model to retrieve the
zero-order ToM strategy chunk instead of the first-order ToM
strategy chunk in the next few repetitions of the task. Thus,
the model still gives an answer to the second-order false belief
question based on zero-order reasoning. Nevertheless, each time
that the model gets the negative feedback “Wrong,” it creates
a first-order ToM strategy chunk. As the identical chunks are
merged in the declarative memory, the first-order ToM strategy
chunk’s activation value increases.
When the activation value of the first-order ToM strategy
chunk is high enough for its successful retrieval, the model gives
an answer to the second-order false belief question based on first-
order reasoning (toy box). Again, this is not a correct answer to
the second-order false belief question (drawer). After the model
gets the feedback “Wrong,” it again increments the first-order
strategy by attributing a first-order ToM strategy to another agent
(Ayla), which makes it a second-order ToM strategy, because
this time the model gives an answer based on what Murat
thinks (first-order) from Ayla’s perspective (second-order). This
second-order strategy gives the correct answer (drawer). Given
the positive feedback “Correct,” the second-order ToM strategy is
further strengthened and finally becomes stable. In theory, there
is no limitation on the level of strategy chunks. Nevertheless, in
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 275
fpsyg-08-00275 February 27, 2017 Time: 17:3 # 7
Arslan et al. The Development of Second-Order Theory of Mind
practice there is no need to use a very high level of reasoning
(Meijering et al., 2014), and even if one tries to apply more than
third-order or fourth-order ToM reasoning, it will be very hard
to apply that strategy due to memory limitations (see Kinderman
et al., 1998 and Stiller and Dunbar, 2007 for adults’ limitations in
higher levels of ToM reasoning).
How the Reinforcement Learning Model
Goes Through Transitions
Unlike our instance-based learning model in which the reasoning
strategy chunks (i.e., zero-order, first-order, second-order) are
added to the declarative memory over the repetition of the task,
in the reinforcement learning model the reasoning strategies are
implemented with production rules. Therefore, the model selects
one of these strategies based on their utilities.
Similar to the zero-order ToM strategy chunk’s relatively high
base-level activation in the instance-based learning model, the
utility of the production rule of the zero-order ToM strategy is
arbitrarily set to a much higher value (100) than the production
rules that represent the first-order (25) and second-order (5)
ToM strategies. Thus, initially the reinforcement learning model
gives zero-order answers. The relativity of those values is the
assumption that the model has a lot of experience with the zero-
order ToM strategy, and more experience with the first-order
ToM strategy than the second-order ToM strategy, based on
children’s development.
After the reinforcement learning model gives the zero-order
answer (TV stand), it gets the feedback “Wrong.” Based on this
feedback, the zero-order ToM strategy production rule gets zero
reward. As explained in Section “The Relevant Mechanisms of
the Cognitive Architecture ACT-R,” this mechanism decreases
the utility of the zero-order ToM strategy production rule. The
first-order ToM strategy production rules are executed when
the utility of the zero-order ToM strategy decreases enough
(to around 25). After selection of a first-order ToM strategy,
the model again gets zero reward. This reward is propagated
back through the other production rules of the first-order ToM
strategy up to the production rule that gives the zero-order
answer. Finally, when the model is able to execute the second-
order strategy and to give the correct answer (drawer), it gets a
higher reward (20). Therefore, the second-order ToM strategy
becomes the dominant strategy. Importantly, as we discussed in
the Introduction, the selection of ToM strategies is purely based
on a utility mechanism, thus it is implicit compared to the explicit
ToM strategy of the instance-based model.
General Assumptions and Reasoning
Steps in Both Models
Even though our models are not dependent on the particular
features of a specific second-order false belief task, we modeled
children’s reasoning in the prototype of a modified version of
the standard second-order false belief that we explained in the
introduction (see Figure 1). One of the assumptions of our
models is that the models already heard the second-order false
belief story and are ready to answer the second-order false belief
question “Where does Ayla think that Murat will look for the
chocolate?” Thus, the story facts are already in the models’
declarative memory. The models do not store the entire story
in their declarative memory but just the facts that are related to
answering the second-order false belief question. Table 1 presents
the verbal representation of those story facts5. As can be seen
from Table 1, each story fact is associated with a specific time,
meaning that the model knows which events happened after,
before, or at the same time as a certain other event. Unlike
the reinforcement learning model, the instance-based learning
model starts with a zero-order ToM strategy chunk in declarative
memory in addition to the story facts.
Both models have the following task-independent knowledge
to answer the second-order false belief question (see Stenning and
van Lambalgen, 2008 for an example formalization of a first-order
false belief task by using similar task-independent knowledge):
(i) The location of an object changes by an action toward that
object; (ii) ‘Seeing leads to knowing,’ which is acquired by children
around the age of 3 (Pratt and Bryant, 1990); (iii) People search
for objects at the location where they have last seen them unless
they are informed that there is a change in the location of the
object; (iv) Other people reason ‘like me.’ For instance, based
on the task-independent knowledge (ii), both models can infer
that Murat knows that the chocolate is in the toy box once the
story fact “Murat saw Ayla at time 2” (Table 1, row 3) has been
retrieved.
Table 2 shows the steps that have been implemented to
give an answer for the second-order false belief question
in the instance-based model and the reinforcement learning
model. As can be seen from Table 2, both models always
use the same set of production rules in the first two steps,
which represent reasoning about reality. This feature of the
models reflects the usual process of a person’s reasoning from
his/her own point of view (Epley et al., 2004). Although the
instance-based and reinforcement learning models have different
learning mechanisms and different underlying assumptions for
the selection of the reasoning strategies, the general idea for both
models is that they reason about another agent as if the other
model is reasoning “like me,” and use this “like me” strategy
recursively. Note that we implemented the models to answer
the second-order false belief question, therefore, the second-
order ToM strategy becomes stable over repetition. However,
when the models hear the first-order false belief question “Where
will Murat look for the chocolate?”, they will use a first-order
strategy instead of a second-order reasoning strategy if the
5For the actual representations in ACT-R, see the Supplementary Data sheet 1 or
https://figshare.com/s/7c3146ad85b3e7a57cd4
TABLE 1 | The representations of story facts that are initially in declarative
memory before the model starts to reason for the second-order false
belief question.
“Murat put the chocolate into the drawer at time t1” Figure 1C
“Ayla put the chocolate into the toy box at time t2” Figure 1D
“Murat saw Ayla at time t2” Figure 1D
“Ayla did not see Murat at time t2” Figure 1D
“The mother put the chocolate into the TV stand at time t3” Figure 1E
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TABLE 2 | The steps that are implemented to give an answer for the second-order false belief question for the instance-based and the reinforcement
learning models.
Instance-based learning model Reinforcement learning model
(1) Retrieve a story fact that has an action verb in its slots. (1) Retrieve a story fact that has an action verb in its slots.
(2) Check the time slot of the retrieved story fact and if it is not the latest fact, request the
latest one.
(2) Check the time slot of the retrieved story fact and if it is not the latest
fact, request the latest one.
(3) Request a retrieval of one of the strategy chunks from declarative memory.
(4) If the zero-order strategy is retrieved, give an answer based on the location slot of the
chunk that is retrieved in the second step. If the kth-order strategy (0 < k ≤ 2) is retrieved,
determine whose knowledge the question is about and give the answer by reasoning as if
that person employs (k-1)th-order reasoning.
(5) Based on the feedback (i.e., Correct/Wrong), strengthen the successful strategy chunk,
or will add or strengthen an alternative strategy if the current one failed.
(3) If the production rule that represents the zero-order strategy has the
highest utility, give an answer based on the location slot of the chunk
that is retrieved in the second step. If the production rule that
represents kth-order strategy (0 < k ≤ 2) has the highest utility, apply
that strategy to give an answer by reasoning as if that person employs
(k-1)th-order reasoning.
(4) Based on the feedback (i.e., Correct/Wrong), give the reward
associated with that level of reasoning strategy.
activation of the first-order strategy is higher than the zero-
order strategy in the instance-based learning model and if
the utility of the first-order reasoning strategy is higher than
that of the zero-order strategy in the reinforcement learning
model.
In more detail, the kth-order reasoning production rules
shared by both of the models are as follows: If the zero-order
strategy is retrieved, give an answer based on the location slot
of the chunk that has been retrieved previously. If the first-order
strategy is retrieved, check whether Murat saw the object in that
location or not. If Murat saw the object in that location, give an
answer based on the location slot of the chunk, otherwise retrieve
a chunk in which Murat saw the object previously and give an
answer based on the location slot of that chunk. If the second-
order strategy is retrieved, repeat the procedure of the first-order
strategy, however, this time, instead of giving the answer from
Murat’s perspective, check whether Ayla saw Murat at that time.
If Ayla did not see Murat, then retrieve a chunk in which Murat
put the object and give an answer based on the location slot of
that chunk6.
Therefore, the generalized explanation of this procedure can
be summarized as follows: If the kth-order strategy (0 < k ≤ 2) is
retrieved, determine whose knowledge the question is about and
give the answer by reasoning as if that person employs (k-1)th-
order reasoning.
Parameters
Following the criteria that we stated in Section “Previous Models
of False Belief Reasoning,” we did not introduce any new
parameters in addition to ACT-R’s own parameters. Moreover,
all the parameters were set to their default values, except the
retrieval threshold and the instantaneous noise parameters for
the instance-based learning model and the utility noise parameter
for the reinforcement learning model (there are no default values
in ACT-R for those parameters). As previous empirical studies
showed that children mostly give correct answers for the control
questions (Flobbe et al., 2008; Hollebrandse et al., 2008), the
retrieval threshold was set to an arbitrary low value (−5), so that
6It works similarly for the other possible first-order and second-order ToM
questions in which Ayla and Murat appear (i.e., “Where will Ayla look for the
chocolate?” and “Where does Murat think that Ayla will look for the chocolate?”).
the model is always able to retrieve the story facts. Thus, our
models’ failure in the second-order false belief task is not due
to forgetting some of the story facts but due to inappropriate
strategy selection.
For the reinforcement learning model, we turned the utility
learning parameter on. Similar to activations, noise is added to
utilities. Noise is controlled by the utility noise parameter, which
is set to 3.
Model Results and Predictions
In this section, we present the results and predictions of the
instance-based model and the reinforcement learning model.
Instance-Based Learning Model Results
To show the developmental transitions from zero-order to
second-order reasoning, we ran the model 100 times per ‘virtual
child,’ indicating that one child learns to apply second-order
reasoning over time by gaining experience. To average the results
across 100 children, we made 100 repetitions of the second-order
false belief task for each ‘virtual child.’ Thus, we ran the model
10,000 times in total. For each ‘virtual child,’ the initial activation
of the zero-order reasoning chunk was set to 6, indicating that
children have a lot of experience with zero-order reasoning.
Figure 2A shows the proportion of the levels of reasoning the
model applies, and Figure 2B shows the activation values of the
strategy chunks over time.
In Figure 2A, around the 12th repetition, the model uses
the first-order strategy (60%) more than the zero-order strategy
(40%). Around the 26th repetition, the model uses both second-
order (50%) and first-order (50%) reasoning with an equal
chance, and around the 40th repetition the model uses second-
order reasoning (80%) much more than first-order reasoning
(20%). Finally, around the 50th repetition, the second-order
reasoning strategy becomes stable (100%).
As we explained in Section “How the Instance-Based Learning
Model Goes Through Transitions,” the transitions in the strategy
chunks are based on the activation of those chunks. In
Figure 2B, around the 10th repetition, the first-order ToM
strategy chunk’s activation becomes higher than that of the zero-
order ToM strategy chunk which leads the model to apply
first-order ToM instead of the zero-order ToM. Finally, around
the 26th repetition, the activation of the second-order ToM
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Proportions of the reasoning level that the instance-based learning model applies, and (B) The activation values of the reasoning level strategy
chunks, plotted as a function of number of repetitions.
FIGURE 3 | (A) Proportions of the reasoning level that the reinforcement learning model applies, and (B) The utility values of the strategies, plotted as a function of
number of repetitions.
strategy chunk’s activation becomes higher than that of the
other strategies, so that the model makes a second-order belief
attribution to Ayla.
Reinforcement Learning Model Results
Similar to the instance-based learning model, we ran the
reinforcement learning model 10,000 times in total to average the
results across 100 ‘virtual children’ repeating the second-order
false belief task 100 times each. Figure 3A shows the proportion
of the levels of reasoning that the reinforcement learning model
applies, and Figure 3B shows the utility values of the strategies.
Different from the instance-based learning model’s results
(see Figure 3A), the reinforcement learning model does not
go through the transitions in a stepwise fashion. Until around
the 10th repetition, the model uses a zero-order strategy and a
first-order strategy randomly (50%/50%), and does not use the
second-order strategy. Before the model starts to use the second-
order strategy more often (60%) than the other two strategies
(around 30th repetition), it uses both the zero-order and first-
order strategies, and not necessarily the first-order strategy more
often than the zero-order one. Finally, around the 50th repetition,
the second-order reasoning strategy becomes stable (100%).
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Comparing the Predictions of the Two Models
(1) The first predictions of the instance-based and
reinforcement learning models are related to children’s
errors in second-order false belief tasks. Following the
pattern in Figure 2A, the instance-based learning model
predicts that children who do not have enough experience
with second-order reasoning give first-order answers to
the second-order false belief question. On the other hand,
following the pattern in Figure 3A, once the reinforcement
learning model is able to execute the first-order ToM
strategy, it selects between zero-order and first-order
ToM strategies randomly, on the basis of noise. Thus,
the reinforcement learning model does not predict that
children’s wrong answers would most of the time be based
on the first-order reasoning strategy7.
(2) The second predictions of both models are related to
learning second-order false belief reasoning over time based
on the given feedback. Both of the models predict that
children who have enough experience with first-order ToM
reasoning but not with second-order ToM reasoning can
learn to apply second-order ToM without any need to
have further explanations of why their answer is wrong.
This prediction contrasts with previous findings showing
that 4-year-old children’s performance on first-order false
belief tasks cannot be improved when they are trained
on false belief tasks with feedback without giving detailed
explanations (Clements et al., 2000).
(3) Although both models predict that training children
with feedback “Wrong” is sufficient to accelerate their
development of second-order false belief reasoning, the
instance-based learning model provides an additional
underlying prediction. Because the instance-based learning
model explicitly increments its wrong first-order ToM
strategy to the correct second-order ToM strategy, if
the model would receive feedback together with further
explanations (not only “Wrong”), the odds of selecting
the correct strategy would increase. In contrast, providing
feedback with further explanations does not provide
any useful additional information for the reinforcement
learning model.
EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION OF THE
INSTANCE-BASED LEARNING MODEL
In this section, we present the experimental validation of our
instance-based learning model’s first prediction, which proposes
that 5-year-old children will give first-order ToM answers in the
second-order false belief task.
7Note that one can argue that the predictions of the reinforcement learning model
may be changed by just adjusting the initial utilities of the strategies or the added
noise parameters. While changing the initial utility values or the noise values would
change the exact curves in Figure 3A, both manipulations would not change the
reinforcement learning model’s prediction unless the second-order ToM strategy
has higher utility than the zero-order and first-order ToM strategies, which is
theoretically not plausible (see Supplementary Image 1 for examples of the models’
results with different utility values and different noise values).
Participants
In order to test our model-based predictions related to children’s
wrong answers, we analyzed the cross-sectional data (pre-test) of
a larger training study that includes a sample of 79 Dutch 5- to 6-
year-old children (38 female, Mage = 5.7 years, SE = 0.04, range:
5.0 – 6.8 years). All children were recruited from a primary school
in Groningen, the Netherlands from predominantly upper-
middle-class families. The children were tested individually in
their school in a separate room.
Approval and parental consent was obtained in accordance
with Dutch law. Because we are interested in children’s wrong
answers, seven children who gave correct answers for both
of the second-order false belief questions were excluded from
our analysis. Therefore, the analysis included the results of
72 children (36 female, Mage = 5.7 years, SE = 0.05, range:
5.0 – 6.8).8
Materials
Children’s answers to 17 different second-order false belief stories
of two different types9 were analyzed: (i) 3 ‘Three locations’
stories, (ii) 14 ‘Three goals’ stories. Within the story types,
we always kept the structure the same while we changed the
name, gender and appearance of the protagonists, along with the
objects and the locations, or goals. Stories of both types were
constructed in such a way that it is possible to infer whether
children’s possible answers to second-order false belief questions
correspond to zero-order, first-order, or second-order reasoning.
Control questions including the reality (zero-order) and first-
order false belief questions were asked before the second-order
false belief questions, to test that children did not have major
memory problems about the story facts, linguistic problems about
the questions, and first-order false belief attribution.
‘Three locations’ stories were constructed based on Flobbe
et al.’s (2008) ‘Chocolate Bar’ story (see Figure 1). As we
discussed in the introduction, inspired by Hollebrandse et al.’s
(2008), we modified Flobbe et al.’s (2008) Chocolate Bar story
in such a way that it is possible to distinguish children’s possible
reasoning levels (i.e. zero-order, first-order, second-order) from
their answers to second-order false belief questions. Before the
second-order false belief question (e.g., “Where does Ayla think
that Murat will look for the chocolate?”) and the justification
question (“Why?”), we asked four control questions. The first and
8Note that in our larger training study, children were also tested with a ToM game
and a counting span task. In the ToM game, children were expected to reason
about the computer’s decision and about the computer’s belief about their own
decision. However, the task was too hard for our sample. For the counting span
task, we constructed series of logistic regression models in order to test the effect
of the counting span task score on children’s success and failure of second-order
false belief questions, and also to test its effects on the different orders of children’s
wrong answers (i.e., zero-order, first-order) for both of the second-order false belief
questions. None of those effects were significant. For this reason, we do not present
the task and its results here.
9Children were also tested with another type of stories that are constructed based
on Sullivan et al.’s (1994) Birthday Puppy story. Unlike the ‘Chocolate Bar’ story
that we explained in the Introduction, this type of stories includes only two possible
answers for the second-order false belief question. Therefore, it is not possible to
distinguish whether children’s wrong answers are zero-order or first-order answers.
For this reason, we do not include the results of this story type here. All the tasks
used in this study and the different story types were presented in random order.
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FIGURE 4 | The proportion of children’s level of ToM reasoning strategies when answering the second-order false belief questions (A) in ‘Three
locations’ stories, (B) in ‘Three goals’ stories.
second control questions were asked after Figure 1D as follows:
(i) “Does Murat know that Ayla put the chocolate into the toy
box?”, (ii) “Does Ayla know that Murat saw her putting the
chocolate into the toy box?”. The third control question (zero-
order ToM) was asked after the fifth episode in Figure 1E: (iii)
“Where is the chocolate now?”. Subsequently, the fourth control
question (first-order false belief question) was asked: (iv) “Where
will Murat look for the chocolate?”.
‘Three goals’ stories included and extended the stories used
in Hollebrandse et al.’s (2008) study. One of the examples of
this story type is as follows: “Ruben and Myrthe play in their
room. Myrthe tells Ruben that she will go to buy chocolate-
chip cookies from the bake sale at the church and she leaves
the house. After that, their mother comes home and tells Ruben
that she just visited the bake sale. Ruben asks his mother
whether they have chocolate-chip cookies at the bake sale. The
mother says, ‘No, they have only apple pies.’ Then Ruben says,
‘Oh, then Myrthe will buy an apple pie’.” At this point, the
experimenter asked the first control question: “Does Myrthe
know that they sell only apple pies in the market?”. The story
continued: “Meanwhile, Myrthe is at the bake sale and asks
for the chocolate-chip cookies. The saleswoman says, ‘Sorry, we
only have muffins.’ Myrthe buys some muffins and goes back
home.” Now, the second control question “Does Ruben know
that Myrthe bought muffins?” and the first-order false belief
question “What does Ruben think they sell in the market?”
together with the justification question “Why does he think that?”
were asked. Then the story proceeded: “While she is on her way
home, she meets the mailman and tells him that she bought
some muffins for her brother Ruben. The mailman asks her
what Ruben thinks that she bought.” Then, the experimenter
asked the participant the second-order false belief question:
“What was Myrthe’s answer to the mailman?”. The justification
question “Why?” was asked after the second-order false belief
question.
There are three possible answers to the second-order false
belief question that children might report: chocolate-chip
cookies, which Myrthe told Ruben initially (correct second-order
answer); an apple pie, which the mother told Ruben (first-
order answer); and muffins, which Myrthe really bought (zero-
order answer).
Procedure
All the stories were presented to the children on a 15-inch
MacBook Pro and were implemented with Psychopy2 v.1.78.01.
All the sessions were recorded with QuickTime. If a child gave
a correct answer for a second-order false belief question, his or
her score was coded as 1, while incorrect answers were coded as
“zero-order” or “first-order” or “I don’t know,” based on the given
answer.
The two different types of second-order false belief stories
were pseudo-randomly drawn from a pool that contained 17
different false belief stories (3 ‘Three location’ stories and 14
‘Three goals’ stories). Drawings illustrating the story episodes
were presented one by one, together with the corresponding
audio recordings. The drawings remained visible throughout the
story. A child was never tested on the same story twice. Children
did not get any feedback.
Results
Figure 4 shows the proportion of children’s level of ToM
reasoning for the second-order false belief questions. Confirming
our instance-based learning model’s prediction, most of the
time children’s wrong answers to the second-order false belief
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TABLE 3 | The percentages of correct answers and standard errors (in
parenthesis) for the control, first-order false belief and second-order false
belief questions for both ‘Three locations’ and ‘Three goals’ story types.
Questions ‘Three locations’ ‘Three goals’
Control 95% (0.02) 96% (0.01)
First-order false belief 81% (0.05) 93% (0.03)
Second-order false belief 17% (0.05) 17% (0.05)
questions were first-order ToM answers (51% in the ‘Three
locations’ stories, and 57% in the ‘Three goals’ stories) and
relatively few of the answers were zero-order ToM answers (28%
in the ‘Three locations’ stories, and 19% in the ‘Three goals’
stories). Overall, 17% of the second-order false belief answers
were correct and 83% of them were wrong. Whereas 65% of the
wrong answers were based on a first-order ToM strategy, 29% of
them were based on a zero-order strategy, and the remaining 6%
was “I don’t know.”
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine
the relation between the two story types and the children’s levels
of reasoning in their wrong answers. The relation between these
variables was not significant. For this reason, we merged the data
over the story types and conducted a chi-square test of goodness-
of-fit to determine whether the zero-order, first-order and “I
don’t know” answers were given equally often. Different levels of
children’s wrong answers were not equal in the population, X2(2,
N = 119)= 64.76, p < 0.001.
Table 3 shows the percentages of correct answers for each
type of question (i.e., control, first-order false belief, second-order
false belief). As can be seen from Table 3, children almost all
the time gave correct answers for the control questions for both
of the story types. Their percentage of correct answers for the
first-order false belief questions was lower in ‘Three locations’
stories (81%) than ‘Three goals’ stories (93%)10. Children’s correct
answers to the second-order false belief questions were lower than
the chance level 33% for both for the ‘Three locations’ stories
(17%) and the ‘Three goals’ stories (17%).
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE WORK
In order to provide a procedural account for children’s strategy
selection while they are answering second-order false belief
questions, we constructed two computational cognitive models:
an instance-based model and a reinforcement learning model.
Importantly, we did not introduce any additional parameters
to the core cognitive architecture ACT-R to trigger a transition
from incorrect to correct answers and we stated a model-based
prediction before conducting our empirical study. Our main
finding in this study is the confirmation of our instance-based
learning model’s prediction that 5- to 6-year-old children who
10The difference between the two story types were at the significance level
for children’s correct answers to first-order false belief questions, X2(1,
N = 144)= 3.88, p= 0.05.
have enough experience in first-order ToM but fail in second-
order false belief tasks apply a first-order ToM strategy in the
second-order false belief tasks. Our empirical results showed
that most of the wrong answers to the second-order false belief
questions were based on a first-order ToM strategy (65%) and few
of the wrong answers were based on a zero-order strategy (29%).
Note that, as we presented in Section “Comparing the Predictions
of the Two Models”, the reinforcement learning model did not
predict that children’s wrong answers would most of the time be
based on the first-order reasoning strategy. Before highlighting
the differences between the two models and explaining their
meaning in children’s second-order ToM development, we would
like to discuss our empirical findings compared to the previous
findings in the second-order ToM literature.
Our empirical findings are consistent with Hollebrandse et al.’s
(2008) results that we explained in the Introduction. Considering
that children were older in Hollebrandse et al.’s (2008) study,
the higher proportion of second-order ToM answers (58%) and
the lack of zero-order ToM answers in their experimental results
compared to ours are in line with our instance-based model’s
first prediction that children who have enough experience with
first-order false belief reasoning but not with second-order
reasoning do not give zero-order answers but first-order answers
for the second-order false belief question. On the other hand,
our empirical findings are in contrast with de Villiers et al.’s
(2014) preliminary results showing that most 5- to 6-year-olds
in low-income preschools gave zero-order ToM answers (60%)
in the second-order false belief task, and fewer of the answers
were based on the first-order ToM strategy (20%). We argue
that the difference between our results and de Villiers et al.’s
(2014) preliminary results can be attributed to their sample’s
low-income socioeconomic status, compared to our sample’s
upper-middle income socioeconomic status (see Holmes et al.,
1996; Cole and Mitchell, 2000 for significant correlations between
family socioeconomic status and individual differences in false
belief performance). Moreover, the school at which we tested
the children is called ‘Excellence school,’ meaning that children’s
scores on the national tests are almost at the upper limit. The
school’s success comes from their adaptive education, which
tries to ensure that both the gifted and the weaker students
perform at their individual maximum. These educational and
socioeconomic differences might be a possible explanation for the
different results.
Our empirical findings confirm the instance-based learning
model’s prediction about children’s wrong answers. One could
argue that children may have been primed to give first-order
answers because the first-order false belief questions were always
asked right before the second-order false belief questions. This
interpretation suggests that children only retrieved the most
recent strategy chunk (i.e., first-order) or alternatively that
they retrieved the most active location and gave their answers
accordingly. However, even if the zero-order ToM question
(“Where is the chocolate?”) were asked in between the first-
order and the second-order false belief questions, we believe that
children would usually give first-order answers. This is because 4-
year-old children can already pass the first-order false belief task
and as long as 5-year-old children have enough experience with
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first-order ToM reasoning, they would usually give first-order
answers instead of zero-order answers. de Villiers et al.’s (2014)
findings can be seen as evidence that asking first-order false belief
questions right before the second-order false belief questions does
not necessarily prime children to give first-order answers.
Moreover, the linguistic literature that shows that children
respond to the embedded part of the second-order false belief
question (i.e., first-order ToM reasoning) can be used as evidence
that children do not only repeat the last given answer but that
they have problems with selecting a strategy or with processing
embedded structures (Astington et al., 2002; de Villiers et al.,
2014).
In addition to the empirical validation of our instance-based
learning model’s prediction, our modeling approach allows us
to provide insight about children’s development of second-order
false belief reasoning. Unlike our reinforcement learning model,
our instance-based learning model selects a ToM strategy which
is “as simple as possible, as complex as necessary” (Meijering
et al., 2014). Similar to this approach, Goodman et al. (2006) used
a Bayesian Occam’s razor effect to explain that children initially
reason from their own perspective (zero-order ToM) in first-
order false belief tasks and then with accumulated evidence revise
their strategy to taking into account another agent’s perspective
(first-order ToM). The main difference between Goodman et al.
(2006) and our modeling approach can be formulated in terms
of Marr’s (1982) levels of analysis. While their model takes place
at the computational level only, our models also reflect the
algorithmic level.
Using the “as simple as possible, as complex as necessary”
approach is also in line with the previous literature on adults’
ToM reasoning in strategic games in which adults are found
to start applying lower levels of ToM strategies and slowly
increment their level of ToM strategy when it is necessary
(Hedden and Zhang, 2002; Camerer et al., 2004; Wright and
Leyton-Brown, 2010; Goodie et al., 2012) and a cost-benefit
approach in which a strategy with the lowest cognitive effort
(cost) and the best accuracy (benefit) is selected (Payne et al.,
1993; Rieskamp and Otto, 2006). Analogous to those approaches,
our instance-based learning model first applies the most salient
and least cognitively effortful strategy, and then if that strategy
does not work increments the strategy one level higher, instead
of two levels higher or more. Unlike the reinforcement learning
model, this approach proposes that children’s strategy revision is
explicit.
One of the assumptions of our models was that initially
children have a lot of experience with the zero-order ToM
strategy because they perceive the world from their own
perspective. On the other hand, once children have enough
experience with first-order ToM reasoning they use the first-
order ToM strategy in second-order false belief tasks. To validate
the assumption about children’s experiences with the different
orders of ToM strategies, further research is needed in which
children’s everyday life experiences are investigated.
Although the reinforcement learning model and the instance-
based learning model provided different predictions about
children’s systematic errors in second-order false belief tasks,
both models predicted that with exposure to second-order
ToM reasoning, 5-year-olds can learn to apply correct second-
order ToM strategy with feedback “Wrong” without any need
for further explanations of why their answer was wrong. This
prediction contrasts with the first-order ToM literature showing
that 4-year-olds’ first-order false belief reasoning cannot be
improved without further explanations (Clements et al., 2000).
On the other hand, different from the reinforcement learning
model, the instance-based learning model predicts that children
who get feedback with explanations are more likely to revise
their wrong first-order ToM strategy to the correct second-order
ToM strategy. To test these model-based predictions, we are
currently conducting a training study in which children hear
different second-order false belief stories in two different training
days with four different experimental conditions (i.e., feedback
without explanation, feedback with explanation, no feedback at
all, and a control condition in which children are trained with
neutral stories that do not involve ToM reasoning). Confirming
our instance-based learning model’s predictions, our preliminary
results show that children’s performance from pre-test to post-
test significantly increases in the feedback without explanation
condition and that children who receive feedback with further
explanations improve more than children who receive feedback
without any further explanations (Arslan et al., 2015a). The
preliminary results of our training study signal that 5-year-
olds’ failure in second-order false belief tasks cannot be due to
maturation, related to increasing functionality of mechanisms
of the brain as in Hiatt and Trafton (2015) unless there is a
stimulus-triggered brain maturation.
Because our model starts to reason from its own perspective
(zero-order ToM), and then takes into account another agent’s
beliefs (first-order ToM), and finally uses ToM recursively
(second-order ToM), we can predict that children will look first
to the picture that represents reality (Figure 1E), then to the
picture that represents the first-order ToM strategy (Figure 1D),
and finally to the picture that represents the second-order ToM
strategy (Figure 1C). An eye-tracking study in which we can
analyze children’s eye movements when children are answering
the second-order false belief questions can provide more insight
about the underlying processes.
Does selecting the correct reasoning strategy mean that
children can perfectly apply that strategy? As we explained
in Section “How the Reinforcement Learning Model Goes
Through Transitions,” once our instance-based learning model
retrieves a second-order ToM strategy, it always gives the
correct answer. More specifically, we have ready production
rules in the model, which apply second-order ToM reasoning
perfectly, when the second-order strategy has been selected. In
line with the complexity explanation, we believe that selecting
the correct strategy is not the whole story in children’s
development of second-order false belief reasoning. When
children select the correct second-order ToM strategy, they
might still make mistakes for different reasons, such as lack of
efficiency in applying reasoning rules and internal or external
distraction. We believe that our experimental results, which
show that 29% of the wrong answers were still based on a
zero-order strategy, as opposed to the 0% predicted by our
instance-based learning model (but see Supplementary Image 1
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showing that changing the noise value causes variation in the
predicted percentages of wrong answers), is related to a working
memory bottleneck or to distraction. The serial processing
bottleneck (Verbrugge, 2009), which causes a lack of efficiency
when children have to serially process embedded beliefs, might
cause an inefficiency to use a second-order ToM strategy. This
hypothesis suggests that children should serially process nested
beliefs in a sequential manner. However, children who cannot
pass second-order false belief tasks might have a lack of efficiency
in serially processing embedded beliefs (for further evidence
supporting the serial processing bottleneck in different cognitive
domains, see Diamond et al., 2002; Hendriks et al., 2007; Van Rij
et al., 2010; Ling et al., 2016) because working memory acts as
a bottleneck (Borst et al., 2010), meaning that people can only
hold one chunk of information in working memory at a time.
More specifically, when children try to answer second-order false
belief questions, e.g., “Where does Mary think that John will look
for the chocolate?”, after inhibiting their own perspective, they
might be holding in mind the answer of the embedded part of the
question (first-order ToM reasoning), which is “Where will John
look for the chocolate?”. To be able to reason about Mary’s false
belief about John’s belief, children need to use efficient rules to
overcome the serial processing bottleneck.
How do children learn ToM reasoning strategies? We surmise
two possible answers to this question. The first possible answer is
related to learning common sense knowledge to reason about the
false belief task. Although our model learns to pass second-order
false belief tasks by repeating the task itself, in real life children do
not learn second-order ToM with false belief stories. Heyes and
Frith (2014) propose that explicit ToM is culturally inherited, and
that parental stories and “causal-explanatory” statements might
be some of the possible sources of this common sense knowledge.
The second possible answer is related to learning those strategies
from other cognitive tasks that are not specifically related to ToM.
It is unlikely that people have complex and specialized rules in
their minds to give a specific answer to false belief questions, as we
have in our model. Based on Arslan et al.’s (2015b) computational
cognitive modeling study which showed that working memory
and cognitive control strategies can contribute to children’s
transitions from failure to success in first-order false belief tasks,
we propose that one of the important sources of combining those
complex and specialized production rules might be children’s
experience in working memory strategies that they apply in
their daily lives, such as counting and comparing the numbers
of objects11. This explanation needs to be tested by designing
a training study in which children are trained with simple
and complex working memory tasks and their performance in
11 See (Taatgen, 2013) about the PRIMs theory for the details of how complex
production rules are combined together and how experience in one domain
transfers to another domain.
second-order false belief reasoning from pre-test to post-test is
assessed.
To sum up, unlike the reinforcement learning model, our
instance-based model is able to predict 5-year-olds’ systematic
errors in second-order false belief tasks, namely by first-order
ToM strategy. Our modeling approach provides a plausible
explanation for children’s systematic errors in second-order false
belief tasks and shows how they revise their ToM strategy. Based
on our instance-based learning model, we can surmise that 5-
year-old children’s failure is due to lack of experience in using a
second-order ToM strategy and that children can explicitly revise
their wrong first-order ToM strategy to a correct second-order
ToM strategy by exposure to second-order ToM reasoning.
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